2209、“我已年老”表示它不再具有这种性质之后，也就是说，它一直不是神性，而是纯粹的人性，后者要被脱去。这从“年老”的含义清楚可知，“年老”是指要脱去人身或人性，如前所述（2198，2203节）。至于一般的理性，当它思想神性事物，尤其基于它自己的真理思想时，绝无可能相信竟会有这种事。这既因为它不理解，还因为由感官幻想产生的表象粘附着它，而它就根据并基于这些幻想来思考，这从前面所举的例子（2196节）明显看出来。对此，为了说明，补充以下内容。
若请教这理性，它能相信圣言拥有内义，并且如前所示，这内义与字义相去甚远吗？它能因此相信那将天与地，也就是将主在天上的国与主在地上的国联结起来的，就是圣言吗？这理性能相信死后，灵魂彼此间有最清晰的交谈，这种交谈无需借助由口头词句构成的言语，却表达得如此充分，以至于他们在一分钟内表达的，比世人用话语在一个小时内表达的还多吗？天使就是这样彼此交谈的，只是他们的语言更完美，是灵人们无法感知的。一进入来世，所有灵魂都知道如何以这种方式说话，尽管他们没有被教导如何这样说。这理性能相信天使在人的一个情感，事实上在他的情感所发出的一声叹息里面感知到如此数不胜数，以至于永远无法描述的事物吗？或相信人所拥有的每一个情感，甚至每一个思维观念都是他的一个形像，并且这形像又奇迹般地包含其生命的一切细节在里面吗？更不用说成千上万的其它这样的事了。
当从感官事物中获得自己的智慧，并充满感官幻想的理性思想这些事时，它不相信它们会是这样，因为它若不从诸如它通过某种感官（无论外在的还是内在的）感知到的那类事物，就不能为自己形成任何观念。那么，当它思想更为高级的神性属天和属灵事物时，情况必是什么样呢？因为人的思维过程总是需要倚靠感官事物所生的某些表象；当这些表象被拿走时，观念就不复存在了，或说思维就消亡了。新来的灵人已经向我清楚表明了这一点，他们最大的快乐就在于他们从世上所带来的表象。他们声称，如果这些表象从他们那里被拿走，他们不知道自己还能不能思考。这就是理性本身的性质。
Potts(1905-1910) 2209
2209. And I am become old. That this signifies after it should no longer be of such a nature, namely, not Divine but human, and that this latter should be put off, is evident from the signification of "becoming old," as being to put off the human (spoken of above, n. 2198, 2203). As regards the rational in general, when it thinks about Divine things, especially from its own truth, it cannot possibly believe that there are such things; both because it does not apprehend them, and because there adhere to it the appearances born from the fallacies of the senses by which and from which it thinks; as is evident from the examples adduced above (n. 2196); to which the following may be added for the sake of illustration. [2] If the rational be consulted, can it believe that the Word has an internal sense, and this so remote from the literal sense as has been shown? And thus that the Word is that which conjoins heaven with earth, that is, the Lord's kingdom in the heavens with the Lord's kingdom on earth? Can the rational believe that souls after death speak with each other most distinctly, without the speech of words, and yet so fully as to express more in a minute than a man does by his speech in an hour? And that the angels do the same, but in a speech still more perfect, and one that is not perceivable by spirits? Also, that on coming into the other life all souls know how to speak in this way, although they receive no instruction in so speaking? Can the rational believe that in one affection of man, nay, in one sigh, there are such numberless things as can never be described, and yet are perceived by angels? And that every affection of man, nay, every idea of his thought, is an image of him, being such as to contain within it in a wonderful manner all the things of his life? Not to mention thousands upon thousands of such things. [3] The rational, which is wise from sensuous things, and is imbued with their fallacies, when thinking of such things, does not believe that they can be so, because it is unable to form to itself any idea except from such things as it perceives by some sense either external or internal; and what then must be the case when it thinks about Divine celestial and spiritual things, which are still higher? For there must always be some appearances from sensuous things, upon which the thought must lean, and when these appearances are withdrawn, the idea perishes, as has also been evident to me from novitiate spirits, who take the greatest delight in the appearances which they have brought with them from the world, saying that if these should be taken away from them, they did not know whether they could think. Such is the rational as regarded in itself.
Elliott(1983-1999) 2209
2209. 'And I have grown old' means after it ceased to be such- that is, ceased to be [merely] human and not Divine - when that which was human was cast off. This is clear from the meaning of 'growing old' as casting off the human, dealt with above in 2198, 2203. As regards the rational in general, when it thinks about Divine things, especially from the truth it possesses, it cannot possibly believe that such things exist. It is unable to do so because for one thing it has no grasp of them, and for another appearances born from the illusions of the senses cling to it, by means of which and from which it thinks, as becomes clear from the examples which have been introduced above in 2196. To these, for the sake of illustration, let the following be added.
[2] Is the rational, if consulted, able to believe in the existence of the internal sense of the Word which, as has been shown, is so remote from the literal sense? And is it thus able to believe that the Word is that which joins heaven and earth together, that is, the Lord's kingdom in heaven to the Lord's kingdom on earth? Is the rational able to believe that souls after death converse with one another most distinctly, doing so not by means of speech consisting of spoken words, yet nevertheless so completely that they express more in a minute than man does in an hour by the use of his speech; or that the angels likewise converse with one another, but in a language which is more perfect still though imperceptible to spirits; and also that all souls on entering the next life know how to use this kind of speech even though they are never taught how to do so? Is the rational able to believe that present within one affection which a person has, indeed within a single sigh expressing his affection, there are things perceived by angels which are so countless that they cannot possibly be described; or that every affection which a person has, indeed every idea comprising his thought, is an image of him and is such that it includes within it in a wondrous fashion every detail of his life, besides thousands upon thousands of other such things?
[3] When the rational which derives its wisdom from the evidence of the senses, and is wrapped in the illusions of the senses, thinks about such things it does not believe that they can be so, for it is not able to form any idea for itself except from such things as it perceives by some sensory power whether external or internal. How must it be when it thinks about Divine celestial and Divine spiritual things which are higher still? For there must always exist, born from the evidence of the senses, some appearances for thought to rest upon, and when these appearances are withdrawn the idea ceases to exist. This has also become clear to me from spirits who are newcomers and who take very great delight in the appearances they have brought with them from the world. They have said that they did not know whether they would be able to think if those appearances were taken away from them. Such is the nature of the rational regarded in itself.
Latin(1748-1756) 2209
2209. `Et ego consenui': quod significet postquam non amplius tale esset, nempe non Divinum sed humanum, et quod hoc exueretur constat a significatione `consenescere' quod sit exuere humanum, de qua supra n. 2198, 2203. Quod rationale in genere attinet, cum cogitat de Divinis, imprimis ex vero quod ei, nusquam credere potest quod talia sint, tam quia illa non capit quam quia apparentiae quae natae: fallaciis sensuum, adhaerent, per quas et ex quibus cogitat, ut constare potest `ex illis exemplis quae allata sunt supra n. 2196; quibus etiam illustrationis causa sequentia addere licet: [2] an rationale si consulatur, credere potest quod sensus internus Verbi detur, et is tam remotus a sensu literali, ut {1} ostensum est; et sic quod Verbum sit quod conjungit caelum cum terra, hoc est, regnum Domini in caelis cum regno Domini in terris? An rationale credere possit quod animae post mortem inter se loquantur distinctissime, et tamen absque loquela vocum, et usque tam plene ut per minutum plura exprimant quam homo per {2} suam loquelam' per horam; et quod angeli similiter, sed loquela adhuc perfectiore et {3} spiritibus imperceptibili; tum quod omnes animae dum in alterum vitam veniunt, ita loqui sciant, tametsi nusquam ad (t)ita loquendum instruuntur? Num rationale credere potest quod in una affectione hominis, immo in uno ejus suspirio, tam indefinita insint quae angeli percipiunt ut nusquam describi possint; et quod unaquaevis affectio hominis, immo unaquaevis idea cogitationis ejus, sit imago ejus, et talis ut ei insint mirabiliter omnia vitae ejus, praeter millia millia talium? [3] Rationale quod ex sensualibus sapit et sensualium fallaciis imbutum est, dum cogitat de illis, non credit ita esse posse, quia sibi formare aliquam ideam nequit {4}, nisi ex talibus quae aliquo sensu externo aut {5} interno percipit. Quid non cum cogitat de Divinis caelestibus et spiritualibus, quae adhuc superiora sunt? Erunt enim semper aliquae apparentiae ex sensualibus, quibus innititur {6} cogitatio, quae apparentiae cum abstrahuntur, perit idea; quod etiam constare mihi potuit a spiritibus novitiis, qui maximopere apparentiis quas e mundo secum traxerunt, delectantur, dicentes, si illae eis subducerentur, quod non scirent an cogitare possent: tale est rationale in se spectatum. @1 tam remotus sit a literali sensu, sicut hactenus.$ @2 sua loquela.$ @3 ac imo.$ @4 de illis non est.$ @5 et I.$ @6 innitura I$