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《圣爱与圣智》 第27节

(一滴水,2018)

  27、凡具有正常理性的人,谁不明白神性是不可分割的?谁不明白多个无限者、非受造者、全能者和神是不可能的?假如有丧失理性的人非要声称多个无限者、非受造者、全能者和神是可能的,只要他们具有一个相同的本质,就能凭这种本质构成一个无限者,那么,一个相同的本质不就等于一位吗?多个位格都具有同一本质是不可能的。若有人说,一位来自另一位,那么来自另一位的这一位,就不是在自己里面的神;然而,在自己里面的神才是神,万物皆源于祂(参看16节)。


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Divine Love and Wisdom #27 (Dole (2003))

27. Surely everyone of sound reason perceives the fact that Divinity is not divisible, that there is not a multiplicity of infinite, uncreated, omnipotent beings, or gods. Suppose some irrational soul were to say that there could be a multiplicity of infinite, uncreated, omnipotent beings, or gods, if only they had a single "same essence," and that this would result in one being who was infinite, uncreated, omnipotent, and god. Would not that single same essence have one "same identity"? And it is not possible for many beings to have one identity. If this individual were to say that one is derived from the other, then the one that is derived from the other is not God in and of himself; yet God in and of himself is the source of all (see 16 above).

Divine Love and Wisdom #27 (Rogers (1999))

27. Is there anyone possessed of sound reason who does not perceive that the Divine is not divisible, and that more than one infinite being, uncreated, omnipotent and God, is not possible? If someone lacking in reason should say that more than one infinite being, uncreated, omnipotent and God, is possible, provided they are of one and the same essence, and that by virtue of this they constitute one infinite being, uncreated, omnipotent and God, is not that same one essence equivalent to one identity? And the same one identity cannot be possessed by more than one being. If someone should say that the one infinite being exists from the other, then the one that exists from the other is not God in Himself, and yet God in Himself is God from whom springs all else (see no. 16 above).

Divine Love and Wisdom #27 (Harley and Harley (1969))

27. What person is there of sound reason who will not perceive that the Divine is not divisible, also that a plurality of Infinites, Uncreates, Omnipotents and Gods is not possible? If someone destitute of reason were to say that a plurality of Infinites, Uncreates, Omnipotents and Gods were possible provided they have one identical essence, and that because of this there is one Infinite, Uncreate, Omnipotent and one God, is not one identical essence one identity? And one identity is not possible to several. If it should be said that one is from the other, then he who is from the other is not God in himself, and yet God in Himself is God from Whom all things are (see above16).

Divine Love and Wisdom #27 (Ager (1890))

27. Who that has sound reason can help seeing that the Divine is not divisible? also that a plurality of Infinites, of Uncreates, of Omnipotents, and of Gods, is impossible? Suppose one destitute of reason were to declare that a plurality of Infinites, of Uncreates, of Omnipotents, and of Gods is possible, if only they have one identical essence, and this would make of them one Infinite, Uncreate, Omnipotent, and God, would not the one identical essence be one identity? And one identity is not possible to several. If it should be said that one is from the other, the one who is from the other is not God in Himself; nevertheless, God in Himself is the God from whom all things are (see above, n. 16).

De Divino Amore et de Divina Sapientia #27 (original Latin,1763)

27. Quis, cui integra ratio est, non percipiet, quod Divinum non dividuum sit, tum quod plures Infiniti, Increati, Omnipotentes ac Dii non dentur; si alius, cui ratio non est, diceret quod plures Infiniti, Increati, Omnipotentes ac Dii dabiles sint, modo una eadem essentia sit illis, et quod per id unus Infinitus, Increatus, Omnipotens et Deus sit, annon una eadem essentia est unum idem, et unum idem pluribus non datur; si diceretur, quod unum sit ab altero, tunc ille qui est ab altero non est Deus in Se, 1 et tamen Deus in Se 2 est Deus a Quo omnia, videatur supra 16.

Footnotes:

1. Prima editio: se,

2. Prima editio: se


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