41、不过，由于这与表象相反，所以若不加以证明，恐怕难以令人信服；既然它只能通过人的身体感官所能感知到的那类事物来证明，那么我们将通过这类事物来证明。人有五种外在感觉，就是触觉、味觉、嗅觉、听觉、视觉。触觉的主体是包裹人的皮肤，正是皮肤的物质与形式使皮肤去感觉凡触碰它之物。触觉并非存在于所触及之物中，而是存在于皮肤的物质与形式中，它们才是主体；感觉本身无非是触碰之物对主体的一种影响。味觉也一样；这种感觉只是舌头的物质与形式所受到的一种影响；舌头是主体。嗅觉同样如此；众所周知，气味影响鼻孔，并在鼻孔中被感觉到，嗅觉是气味散发物触及鼻孔而对它产生的一种影响。听觉同理，它似乎出自声源，但实际上在耳中，是对耳朵的物质与形式的一种影响；听觉在耳朵之外只是一种表象。
视觉也是如此，当人观看远处的物体时，视觉似乎在那里，但实际上在眼睛里，眼睛才是主体，视觉同样是对主体的一种影响。距离完全是根据居间物，或物体的缩小和随之的模糊而得出的关于空间的判断，物体的图像是根据入射角度在眼睛内部产生的。由此明显可知，视觉并非从眼睛发出落到物体上，而是物体的图像进入眼睛，影响了它的物质与形式。听觉和视觉是一样的道理；听觉并非从耳朵发出捕捉声音，而是声音进入耳朵并影响了它。
从这些例证可以看出，对产生感觉的物质与形式的影响并非脱离主体的某种事物，只是在主体里面造成一种变化，无论之前还是之后，主体依然是那个主体。由此可知，视觉、听觉、嗅觉、味觉和触觉并非从它们的器官流出的某种发散物，就其物质与形式而言，它们就是器官本身；当器官受到影响时，感觉便产生了。
41. Since this truth is counter to appearance, though, it may seem unworthy of credence unless some evidence is supplied; and since the only way to supply evidence is with the kinds of thing we perceive with our physical senses, that is what I need to draw on.
We have five external senses, called touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight. The subject of touch is the skin that envelops us: the very substance and form of the skin make it feel what comes into contact with it. The sense of touch is not in the things that come into contact with it but in the substance and form of the skin. That is the subject, and the sense itself is simply the way it is affected by contact.
It is the same with taste. This sense is simply the way a substance and form, this time of the tongue, are affected. The tongue is the subject. It is the same with smell. We recognize that odors affect the nostrils and are in the nostrils, and that smell is the way impinging aromas affect them. It is the same with hearing. It seems as though hearing were in the place where the sound originates, but hearing is in the ear and is the way its substance and form are affected. It is only an appearance that hearing happens at a distance from the ear.
This is true of sight as well. When we see objects at a distance, it seems as though our sight were where they are. However, sight is in the eye, which is the subject; and sight is the way the eye is affected, too. Distance is simply what we infer about space on the basis of intervening objects or on the basis of reduced size and consequent loss of clarity of an object whose image is being presented within the eye according to its angle of incidence. We can see from this that sight does not go out from the eye to the object, but that an image of the object enters the eye and affects its substance and form. It is the same for both sight and hearing. Hearing does not go out of the ear to seize on the sound, but the sound enters the ear and affects it.
It stands to reason, then, that the affecting of substance and form that constitutes a sense is not something separate from the subject. It is simply the effecting of a change within the subject, with the subject remaining the subject throughout and thereafter. It then follows that sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch are not things that go floating out from their organs. They are the organs themselves, in respect to their substance and form. Sensation happens when they are affected.
41. Because this assertion is contrary to the appearance, however, it may seem not to merit credence unless it is demonstrated, and since it cannot be demonstrated except by illustrations that a person can perceive with his physical power of sensation, therefore we will demonstrate it by recourse to such.
A person has five outward senses, which we call touch, taste, smell, hearing and sight.
The subject of which the sense of touch is predicated is the skin that envelops a person. The very substance and form of the skin cause it to feel whatever is brought into contact with it. The sensation of touch does not exist in those things which are brought into contact with it, but it exists in the substance and form of the skin, which are the subject of which it is predicated. The sensation is simply the affecting of it by the things brought into contact with it.
The case is the same with taste. This sensation is simply the affecting of the substance and form which constitute the tongue. The tongue is the subject of which it is predicated.
It is the same with the sense of smell. People know that an odor affects the nostrils and is sensed in the nostrils, and that it is an affecting of them by odorous emanations coming into contact with them.
So, too, with hearing. It seems as though the hearing of a thing exists in the place where the sound originates; but the hearing is in the ear, and is an affecting of its substance and form. The hearing of things at a distance by the ear is only an appearance.
[2] It is the same with sight. When a person sees objects at a distance, it seems as though the sight exists there, but in fact it is in the eye, which is the subject of which it is predicated, and the sight is similarly the affecting of it. Distance is only a conclusion of the judgment regarding the intervening space based on the objects that lie in between, or on the dwindling and consequent fading of the object seen, the image of which is produced within the eye in accordance with its angle of incidence.
It is apparent from this that sight does not go out from the eye to the object, but that an image of the object enters the eye and affects its substance and form. For the case is the same with sight as it is with hearing. Hearing does not go out from the ear to capture sound, but sound enters the ear and affects it.
[3] From these illustrations it can be seen that the affecting of the substance and form which produces a sensation is not something separate from the subject of which it is predicated, but simply causes a change of state in it, the subject remaining still the subject it was before and that it continues to be thereafter. It follows as a consequence that sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch are not some aerial emanation flowing out from their organs, but that they are the organs regarded in terms of their substance and form, the affecting of which produces sensation.
41. But because this is contrary to appearance, it may seem not to merit belief unless it be proved; and since it can be proved only by such things as man can perceive from his bodily senses, it will be proved by these. Man has five external senses which are called touch, taste, smell, hearing and sight. The subject of touch is the skin by which man is enveloped. The very substance and form of the skin cause it to feel the things applied to it. The sense of touch is not in the things applied, but in the substance and form of the skin which are the subject. That sense is only an affecting of it by the things applied. It is the same with taste. This sense is only an affecting of the substance and form which belong to the tongue; the tongue is the subject. It is the same with smell. It is well known that odour affects the nostrils, and that it is in the nostrils, and smell is an affecting of them by the odoriferous things touching them. It is the same with hearing. It appears as if the hearing were in the place where the sound originates, but the hearing is in the ear, and is an affecting of its substance and form. That the hearing is at a distance from the ear is an appearance. It is the same with sight. When a man sees objects at a distance, the seeing appears to be there, but yet the seeing is in the eye which is the subject and is likewise an affecting of it. Distance is solely from the judgment inferring about space from intermediate things or from the diminution and the consequent indistinctness of the object, an image of which is produced interiorly in the eye according to the angle of incidence. From this it is evident that sight does not go out from the eye to the object, but that the image of the object enters the eye and affects its substance and form. Thus it is just the same with sight as it is with hearing. Hearing does not go out from the ear to catch the sound, but the sound enters the ear and affects it. From these considerations it can be established that the affecting of substance and form which causes the sense is not a something separate from the subject, but only causes a change in it, the subject remaining the subject as before and afterwards. Hence it follows that sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch are not a something volatile flowing out of their organs, but that they are the organs themselves, considered in their substance and form, and that when the organs are affected, sensation results.
41. But as this is contrary to appearance, it may seem not to merit belief unless it be proved; and since it can be proved only by such things as man can apprehend by his bodily senses, by these it shall be proved. Man has five external senses, called touch, taste, smell, hearing and sight. The subject of touch is the skin by which man is enveloped, the very substance and form of the skin causing it to feel whatever is applied to it. The sense of touch is not in the things applied, but in the substance and form of the skin, which are the subject; the sense itself is nothing but an affecting of the subject by the things applied. It is the same with taste; this sense is only an affecting of the substance and form of the tongue; the tongue is the subject. It is the same with smell; it is well known that odor affects the nostrils, and that it is in the nostrils, and that the nostrils are affected by the odoriferous particles touching them. It is the same with hearing, which seems to be in the place where the sound originates; but the hearing is in the ear, and is an affecting of its substance and form; that the hearing is at a distance from the ear is an appearance. It is the same with sight. When a man sees objects at a distance, the seeing appears to be there; yet the seeing is in the eye, which is the subject, and is likewise an affecting of the subject. Distance is solely from the judgment concluding about space from things intermediate, or from the diminution and consequent indistinctness of the object, an image of which is produced interiorly in the eye according to the angle of incidence. From this it is evident that sight does not go out from the eye to the object, but that the image of the object enters the eye and affects its substance and form. Thus it is just the same with sight as with hearing; hearing does not go out from the ear to catch the sound, but the sound enters the ear and affects it. From all this it can be seen that the affecting of the substance and form which causes sense is not a something separate from the subject, but only causes a change in it, the subject remaining the subject then as before and afterwards. From this it follows that seeing, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, are not a something volatile flowing from their organs, but are the organs themselves, considered in their substance and form, and that when the organs are affected sense is produced.
41. Sed hoc quia contra apparentiam est, videri potest sicut non merens fidem, nisi demonstretur, et hoc demonstrari non potest nisi quam per talia quae homo percipere potest ex sensu sui corporis, quare per illa demonstrabitur. Sunt homini quinque sensus externi, qui vocantur tactus, gustus, olfactus, auditus et visus. Subjectum Tactus est Cutis, qua homo circumcinctus est; ipsa substantia et forma cutis faciunt ut sentiat applicata; sensus tactus non est in illis quae applicantur, sed est in substantia et forma cutis, quae sunt subjectum; sensus ille est modo affectio ejus ab applicatis. Simile est cum Gustu; hic sensus est modo affectio substantiae et formae, quae sunt linguae; lingua est subjectum. Simile est cum Olfactu; quod odor afficiat nares et quod sit in naribus, et quod sit affectio illarum ab odoriferis tangentibus, notum est. Simile est cum Auditu; apparet sicut auditus sit in loco ubi sonus inchoat, sed auditus est in aure, et est affectio substantiae et formae ejus; quod auditus sit in distantia ab aure, est apparentia.
[2] Simile est cum Visu; apparet dum homo videt objecta ad distantiam sicut visus ibi sit, sed usque est in Oculo, qui est subjectum, et similiter est affectio ejus: distans est solum ex judicio concludente de spatio ex intermediis, vel ex diminutione et inde obscuratione objecti, cujus imago sistitur intus in oculo secundum angulum incidentiae: inde patet, quod visus non exeat ab oculo ad objectum, sed quod imago objecti intret oculum, et afficiat substantiam et formam ejus: simile enim est cum visu quemadmodum est cum auditu; auditus nec exit ab aure ad captandum sonum, sed sonus intrat aurem, et afficit.
[3] Ex his constare potest, quod affectio substantiae et formae, quae facit sensum, non sit separatum quid a subjecto, sed solum faciat mutationem in illo, subjecto remanente subjecto tunc ut prius, et postea; inde sequitur quod visus, auditus, olfactus, gustus et tactus, non sit aliquod volatile effluens ex illorum organis, sed quod sint organa in sua substantia et forma spectata, quae dum afficiuntur fit sensus.