3563.“说，声音是雅各的声音，手却是以扫的手”表在这种情况下，理解力部分由在里面的真理构成，而意愿部分则由在外面的良善构成，因此它们具有颠倒的次序。这从用“声音”论及真理，用“手”论及良善清楚可知。“声音”论及真理，这从第1卷（219-220节）的引证和这些话本身明显看出来，即经上说“声音是雅各的声音”，而雅各代表属世真理，这在前面已反复说明。“手”之所以论及良善，是因为“手”表权柄和能力（878，3541节），权柄和能力的源头无非是良善。真理所拥有的一切权柄和能力皆出自良善，哪怕它看似出自真理。这一点同样从经上的话明显看出来，即“手却是以扫的手”，而以扫代表属世良善，这在前面已经说明。这些事物具有颠倒的次序，这一点从以下事实清楚可知，即：按照次序，属于意愿的良善应该在里面，而属于理解力的真理则应在外面。然而，如前所述，这些事都诸如难以理性解释清楚的那类事，因为很少有人了解这类事物。即便解释得清清楚楚，若缺乏对这类事物的了解，它们仍不被理解。尽管如此，仍有必要讨论这个问题，因为它是此处所论述的主题。
显现在人里面的属世层良善的唯一源头就是内层良善，也就是理性层的良善。显然，属世良善没有其它源头；但从这一个所流入之物决定了那一个里面的良善的性质。由于这是属世层良善的唯一源头，故属世层的真理也出自这一源头。因为良善在哪里，真理就在哪里。若要成为某种事物，这二者都必须存在。再者，所流入之物决定了那里真理的性质。流注以这种方式进行：理性层的良善沿着两条路径流入：通过最短的路径、因而直接流入属世层的良善本身；并通过属世层的良善进入那里的真理；这良善和这真理由以扫和他的野味来代表。理性层的良善也经由不那么短的路径，也就是通过理性层的真理流入属世层，并凭这种流注形成类似良善的某种事物，这种事物其实是真理。
按照次序，理性层的良善直接流入属世层的良善，同时流入它的真理；也经由理性层的真理间接流入属世层的良善，并以同样的方式既直接又间接地流入属世层的真理。若情况是这样，那么流注就符合次序。这就是那些重生之人所具有的流注。但如前所述，重生之前的流注不是这样。也就是说，理性层的良善并非直接、而是经由理性层的真理间接流入属世层的良善，因而在属世层中呈现为类似良善的某种事物；不过，这种事物并不是纯正的良善，因而也不是纯正的真理。相反，它是诸如凭经由理性层的真理而来的流注而从至内在拥有良善的某种事物，不过，再没有更多事物。因此，良善也以另一种形式出现在那里，也就是说，外在像“以扫”所代表的良善，而内在则像“雅各”所代表的真理。这并不符合次序，所以才说它们具有颠倒的次序。然而，从人无法以其它方式重生的角度来说，这是符合次序的。
我意识到，这些事无论阐述得多么清晰，因而能被那些知道这类事物存在的人清楚感知到，但对那些不知道何为流注的人来说，它们仍是模糊的；对那些不知道理性层与属世层截然不同、彼此分离的人来说，更加模糊；而对那些对良善与真理没有任何明确、清晰的概念之人来说，还要模糊。但在重生前的状态下，属世良善与属世真理的性质仅从当时的情感就能明显看出来。若一个人渴望真理不是以生活为目的，而是有其它目的，比如他可以变得有学问，而变得有学问是出于超越别人的某种情感，或出于某种孩子般的嫉妒的情感，以及出于某种荣耀的情感，这时，属世层的良善和属世层的真理所具有的次序就类似于此处雅各所代表的次序。所以，相对彼此来说，它们处于颠倒的次序，也就是说，良善所属的意愿在外面，而真理所属的理解力在里面。
但在重生后的状态下，情况就不同了。在这种情况下，人渴望真理不仅因为他着眼于生活，更因为他渴望构成那生活的良善本身。之前的情感，也就是超越、嫉妒和荣耀的情感，就都离开了，以至于看似被驱散了。这时，属于意愿的良善在里面，而属于理解力的真理在外面；然而，仍以这样的方式：真理与良善行如一体，因为这真理源于良善。这种次序才是纯正的次序。前一种次序也旨在形成这种次序，因为那时，在外面的意愿允许大量有助于重生的事物进入，就像海绵吸水，无论这水是清澈的还是浑浊的，因此，它也吸收了本来要被弃绝的那类事物。事实上，这些事物是工具，也是为形成有关良善与真理的概念而服务的；此外，它们还服务于其它用途。
Potts(1905-1910) 3563
3563. And said, The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau. That this signifies that in this case the intellectual part is of truth which is within, but that the will part is of good which is without, thus that they are of inverted order, is evident from the predication of "voice" as being of truth, and from the predication of "hand" as being of good (that "voice" is predicated of truth is evident from what was adduced in volume 1, n. 219-220); and from its being said, "the voice is Jacob's voice," by whom is represented natural truth, as has been repeatedly shown above. And the reason why "hand" is predicated of good is that by "hand" is signified power and faculty (n. 878, 3541), which is derived from no other source than good, all the power and faculty of truth being therefrom, although it appears to be from truth; the same is evident also from its being said, "the hands are the hands of Esau," by whom good is represented, as also has been shown above. That these things are of inverted order is evident from the fact that it is according to order for good which is of the will to be within, and for truth which is of the understanding to be without. However, as before said, these things are such that they cannot be so well set forth to the apprehension, because few are in any knowledge concerning such things; for even if they should be most clearly set forth, yet when knowledge is wanting they are not apprehended and yet it is necessary to state how the case is, because this is the subject here treated of. [2] The good of the natural comes forth from no other source in man than interior good, that is, from the good of the rational; that the natural has good from no other source is evident; but the influx causes the good in the natural to be such as the natural is; and as this is the only source of the good of the natural, the truth of the natural is from the same source; for where good is, there is truth, both being necessary in order that there may be anything; but the influx causes the truth therein to be such as is that into which it flows. The influx takes place in this way: The good of the rational flows into the natural in two ways; through the shortest way, into the good itself of the natural, thus immediately; and through the good of the natural into the truth there; this good and this truth are what is represented by Esau and his hunting. The good of the rational also flows into the natural by a way less short, namely, through the truth of the rational, and by this influx forms something like good, but it is truth. [3] It is according to order that the good of the rational should inflow into the good of the natural and at the same time into its truth, immediately; and also through the truth, of the rational into the good of the natural, thus mediately; and in like manner into the truth of the natural both immediately and mediately; and when this is the case, then the influx is according to order. Such influx exists with those who have been regenerated; but as before said there is another influx before they have been regenerated, namely, that the good of the rational does not flow immediately into the good of the natural, but mediately through the truth of the rational, and thus presents something like good in the natural, but which is not genuine good, and consequently not genuine truth; yet it is such that inmostly it really has good from the influx through the truth of the rational; but no further. Therefore also good comes forth there under another form, namely, outwardly like the good which is represented by Esau, but inwardly like the truth which is represented by Jacob; and as this is not according to order, it is said to be of inverted order; but yet in respect to the fact that man can be regenerated in no other way, it is according to order. [4] I am aware that these things, even though clearly stated, and consequently possible of clear perception on the part of those who are in the knowledge of such things, are yet obscure to those who do not know what influx is; and still more so to those who do not know that the rational is distinct from the natural; and still more so to those who have not any distinct idea about good and truth. But what the quality of natural good is, and of natural truth, in the state previous to regeneration, can appear solely from the affections at that time. When man is affected with truth, not for the sake of ends of life, but for the sake of other ends, such as that he may become learned, and this from a certain affection of emulation, or from a certain affection of childish envy, and also from a certain affection of glory; then are the good of the natural and the truth of the natural in such an order as is here represented by Jacob, consequently relatively to each other they are in inverted order; that is, the will part which is of good is without, and the intellectual part which is of truth is within. [5] But in the state after regeneration it is otherwise; for then man is not only affected with truth for the sake of ends of life, but still more is he affected with the good itself of life; and the former affections, namely those of emulation, of childish envy, and of glory, separate themselves, and this until it appears as if they were dissipated; for then the good which is of the will is within, and the truth which is of the understanding is without; yet still in such a manner that truth acts as a one with good, because from good. This order is genuine; and the former order tends to the forming of this order, inasmuch as the will part, which is then without, admits many things that are serviceable to regeneration, and is like a sponge that absorbs both clear and muddy waters; thus also it admits things that would otherwise be rejected, which yet serve as means, and also for forming ideas about goods and truths, and for other uses.
Elliott(1983-1999) 3563
3563. 'And said, The voice is Jacob's voice, and the hands Esau's hands' means that the understanding consists in this case of truth existing inwardly, while the will consists in this case of good existing outwardly, so that an inversion of order exists with them. This is clear from the use of 'voice' to refer to truth and of 'hand' to refer to good. For 'voice' is used in reference to truth, as is evident from the places introduced in Volume One, in 219, 220, and from the fact that the actual words used are 'the voice is Jacob's voice', Jacob representing natural truth, as shown in various places above. And the reason why 'hand' is used in reference to good is that 'the hand' means power and ability, 878, 3541, the source of which is nothing other than good. All the power and ability that truth possesses comes from good, even though it seems to come from truth. This likewise is evident from the fact that the actual words used are 'the hands are Esau's hands', Esau representing natural good, as also shown above. The consequent existence of an inversion of order with them is evident from the consideration that proper order requires good, which belongs to the will, to exist inwardly, and truth, which belongs to the understanding, to exist outwardly. But these matters, as stated above, are such as can hardly be explained in any intelligible way because few have any knowledge of such things. For even if a perfectly clear explanation of them were given they would still not be understood if knowledge of them is lacking. Nevertheless the matter must be discussed since it is the subject at this point.
[2] The only source of the good of the natural which manifests itself in a person is interior good, that is, the good of the rational. Natural good can have no other source, though that which flows in from the one determines the nature of the good in the other. And since the good of the natural comes from no other source, neither does the truth of the natural, for where good is, so also is truth. Both must be present if they are to be anything at all. And again, that which flows in determines the nature of the truth there. Influx is such that the good of the rational flows into the natural along two different routes - one a very short and thus direct route into the good itself of the natural, and then on through the good of the natural into the truth there, this good and this truth being represented by Esau and his venison. In addition to this, the good of the rational flows into the natural along a second route which is less short, that is to say, through the truth of the rational, by means of which influx it forms something resembling good, but which in fact is truth.
[3] Everything is thus taking place according to order when the good of the rational flows directly into the good of the natural and at the same time into the truth there, and also indirectly by way of the truth of the rational into the good of the natural, and in a similar way both directly and indirectly into the truth of the natural. When all this is taking place the influx is according to order. Such is the influx with those who have been regenerated. But a different influx exists prior to regeneration, as has been stated above. That is to say, the good of the rational does not flow into the good of the natural directly but indirectly, by way of the truth of the rational, and so manifests something resembling good in the natural, which is not genuine good nor consequently genuine truth. Instead it is something such as does indeed possess good inmostly by virtue of influx through the truth of the rational; but there is nothing more. Therefore good too presents itself there under a different form, that is to say, outwardly as good represented by 'Esau' but inwardly as truth represented by 'Jacob'. And as this is not in accordance with order an inversion of order is said to exist with them. Yet insofar as nobody can be regenerated in any other way it is according to order.
[4] I realize that no matter how clearly these matters are stated and as a consequence are able to be perceived clearly by those who have a knowledge of the existence of such things, they still remain obscure to those who do not know what influx is, more so to those who do not know that the rational is distinct and separate from the natural, and more so still to those who do not have any distinct and clear idea of what good is or of what truth is. But the nature of natural good and of natural truth in the state prior to regeneration is plain to see only from the desires present at that time. When a person desires truth not because he has life in view but some other ends, such as to become learned, and to become this because of some desire to outdo others, which amounts to childish envy, and also because of some desire for glory, the order existing with the good of the natural and the truth of the natural is akin to that represented here by Jacob. As these two exist in relation to each other, there is a reversal of order, that is to say, the will, to which good belongs, exists outwardly, while the understanding, to which truth belongs, exists inwardly.
[5] But in the state following regeneration the situation is different. In this case the person desires truth not only because he has life in view but more still because he desires the good itself which constitutes that life. Previous desires, that is to say, those connected with outdoing, with childish envy, and with glory, now break away, so much so that they seem so to speak to have been dispelled. At this point good which belongs to the will exists inwardly, and truth which belongs to the understanding exists outwardly. The result then is that truth acts as one with good since it stems from good. This order is genuine order. The order existing previously also serves to bring this order about, for the will which at that time occupies an external position allows many things to come in which contribute to regeneration, like a sponge which absorbs water, clear or muddy, so that it absorbs such things as would otherwise be rejected. Indeed these things serve as means and also as ideas that have to be formed concerning genuine goods and truths, besides other uses which they serve.
Latin(1748-1756) 3563
3563. `Et dixit, Vox vox Jacobi, et manus manus Esavi': quod significet quod intellectuale ibi sit veri quod intus, sed voluntarium ibi sit boni quod extus, ita inversi ordinis, constat a praedicatione `vocis' quod sit de vero, et a praedicatione `manus' quod sit de bono; quod `vox' praedicetur de vero, patet ab illis quae in Parte Prima n. 219, 220 allata sunt, et ex eo quod dicatur `vox vox Jacobi,' per quem quod repraesentetur verum naturale, supra passim ostensum est; et quod manus praedicetur de bono, est quia per `manum' significatur potentia et facultas, n. (x)878, 3541, quae non aliunde est quam ex bono; omnis potentia et facultas vero est inde, tametsi apparet {1} a vero; etiam patet ex eo quod dicatur, `manus manus Esavi,' per quem quod repraesentetur bonum naturale, etiam supra ostensum est; quod illa inversi ordinis sint, patet ex eo quod secundum ordinem sit, ut bonum quod voluntatis, sit intus, et verum quod intellectus, sit extus; sed haec, ut supra dictum, talia sunt quae quia pauci in aliqua cognitione de talibus sunt, non ad captum exponi ita possunt, nam etiamsi clarissime exponerentur, non tamen, cum cognitio deest, capiuntur; sed usque dicendum quomodo se habet, quia de hac re agitur: [2] bonum naturalis non aliunde apud hominem existit quam a bono interiore, hoc est, a bono rationalis; naturale non aliunde bonum habere {2}potest; sed influxus facit ut tale ibi sit bonum quale est; et quia bonum naturalis non est aliunde, etiam verum naturalis est inde, ubi enim bonum, ibi est verum; utrumque erit ut sit aliquid; sed influxus etiam facit ut tale sit ibi verum quale est. Influxus est talis; bonum rationalis influit in naturale per duplicem viam, nempe per viam brevissimam, in ipsum bonum naturalis, ita immediate, et per bonum {3}naturalis ibi in verum; hoc bonum et hoc verum est quod repraesentatur per Esavum et ejus venationem; bonum rationalis etiam influit in naturale per viam minus brevem, nempe per verum rationalis, et per illum influxum format aliquod simile bono, sed est verum: [3] secundum ordinem ita fit quod bonum rationalis influat in bonum naturalis, et simul in verum, immediate, et quoque per verum rationalis in bonum ibi, ita mediate, similiter in verum naturalis immediate et mediate; cum ita fit, tunc influxus est secundum ordinem; talis influxus est apud illos qui regenerati sunt; sed alius influxus est antequam regenerati, ut supra {4}dictum, nempe quod bonum rationalis non immediate in bonum naturalis influat, sed mediate per verum rationalis, et sic sistat aliquid simile boni in naturali, sed non est genuinum bonum, {5}et inde non genuinum verum, sed est tale quod quidem intime habet bonum, ex influxu per verum rationalis, sed non amplius; ideo etiam bonum existit ibi sub alia forma, nempe extus sicut bonum quod repraesentatur per `Esavum,' sed intus sicut verum quod repraesentatur per `Jacobum,' quod quia non secundum ordinem est, dicitur esse inversi ordinis; sed usque respective ad id quod ita non aliter regenerari possit homo, est secundum ordinem. [4] Scio quod haec tametsi clare dicta sunt, et consequenter clare ab illis percipi possunt qui in cognitione talium sunt, usque sint obscura coram illis qui non sciunt quid influxus, et magis qui non sciunt quod rationale distinctum sit a naturali, et adhuc magis coram illis qui non aliquam distinctam ideam habent de bono et de vero: sed quale sit bonum naturale et verum naturale in statu ante regenerationem, solum manifestum esse potest ex affectionibus tunc; cum homo afficitur vero non propter fines vitae, sed propter alios fines, ut nempe eruditus fiat, et hoc ex quadam affectione aemulationis, seu ex quadam affectione invidiae infantilis, et quoque ex quadam affectione gloriae, tunc est bonum naturalis et verum naturalis in tali ordine qualis hic per `Jacobum' repraesentatur, proinde est in ordine inverso respective, nempe tunc voluntarium quod est boni, est extus, et intellectuale quod veri, est intus; at in statu post regenerationem haec se aliter habent; [5] tunc non modo afficitur homo vero propter fines vitae, sed adhuc plus afficitur ipso bono vitae, et affectiones priores, nempe aemulationis, {6}invidiae infantilis et gloriae se separant, et hoc usque ut appareat quasi quod dissipatae sint, tunc enim bonum quod voluntatis, (t)est intus, et verum quod intellectus, est extus, sed usque ita ut verum (t)agat unum cum bono, quia ex bono; hic ordo est genuinus; et ad hunc ordinem formandum intendit prior ordo, nam voluntarium {7}quod tunc extus est, admittit plura quae inserviunt pro regeneratione, {8}est sicut spongia quae haurit aquas tam limpidas quam lutulentas; ita quoque talia, quae alioquin respuerentur, et tamen inserviunt pro mediis, et quoque pro ideis formandis de bonis et veris {9}, praeter pro aliis usibus. @1 veri$ @2 patet I$ @3 naturale$ @4 i passim$ @5 nec inde$ @6 invidia I$ @7 i seu bonum$ @8 i inde$ @9 i genuinis$