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《圣治(天意)》 第74节

(一滴水译,2022)

  74、⑵凡一个人出于自由所行的,无论是否理性,只要符合他的理性,在他看来似乎都是他自己的。想要清楚说明人所特有的理性和自由是什么,最好的方式就是对比人和动物。因为动物没有理性或理解能力,也没有自由或自由意愿的能力。因此,它们没有理解力或意愿;取代理解力的是它们所拥有的知识;取代意愿的,是它们所拥有的情感;这两者都是属世的。它们因没有这两种官能,故没有思维;取代思维的是它们所拥有的内在视觉,这内在视觉通过对应而与它们的外在视觉构成一体。

  每种情感都有自己像配偶一样的同伴。属世之爱的情感有知识,属灵之爱的情感有理解力,属天之爱的情感有智慧。因为一种情感若没有如配偶那样的同伴,就什么也不是;它就像没有显现的存在,或没有形式的物质,它们都没有任何属性。这就是为何一切受造物里面都有涉及良善与真理的婚姻的某种东西,如前面多处所说明的。动物有一种情感和知识的婚姻,它们的情感属于属世良善,知识属于属世真理。

  由于动物的情感和知识完全行如一体,并且它们的情感不能被提升超越它们的知识,它们的知识也不能超越它们的情感,而是当被提升时,两者一起被提升;还由于它们没有能被提升所进入的属灵心智,或属灵心智的光和热,所以它们没有理解能力,即理性,也没有自由意愿的能力,即自由,只有属世情感及其知识。它们所拥有的属世情感,是一种对觅食、筑巢或窝,繁衍后代、逃避或躲避伤害的情感,连同这种情感所需的一切知识。这就是它们的生命状态,所以它们不能思考:“我想这样或不想这样;我知道这个或不知道这个”;更不能思考:“我理解这个,我爱这个”;它们只是出于其情感通过其知识被左右,没有理性或自由。这种“左右”不是来自自然界,而是来自灵界,因为自然界中的事物无不与灵界有关。产生结果的一切原因都来自灵界。关于这个主题,详情可参看下文(96节)


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Divine Providence (Rogers translation 2003) 74

74. (2) Whatever a person does in freedom, whether it accords with reason or not, provided it accords with his reason, appears to him as his own doing. What rationality and freedom, faculties peculiar to humankind, are, cannot be more clearly known than by a comparison of human beings with animals. For animals do not have any rationality or faculty for understanding, nor any freedom or faculty for freely willing, and therefore they do not have an intellect and will, but instead of an intellect have knowledge, and instead of a will have affection, both of which are natural. Moreover, because they do not have these two faculties, neither do they have thought, therefore, but instead of thought have an internal vision which is united by correspondence with their external vision.

[2] Every affection has its own partner as a mate. An affection of a natural love has knowledge, an affection of a spiritual love intelligence, and an affection of a celestial love wisdom. For without its partner as a mate, affection has no reality, but is like being without expression, or like substance without form, of which nothing can be predicated. It is because of this that every created thing has present in it something assignable to a marriage of goodness and truth, as we have shown in many places above. In animals it is a marriage of affection and knowledge. The affection there is an affection for natural good, and the knowledge a knowlege of natural truth.

[3] Now because affection and knowledge in animals are wholly united, and their affection cannot be elevated above their knowledge, nor their knowledge above their affection, and if they are elevated the two are elevated together, and because animals do not have any spiritual mind into which, or into whose light and warmth, they can be elevated, therefore they do not have a faculty for understanding or rationality, or a faculty for freely willing or freedom, but instead have a merely natural affection with its accompanying knowledge. The natural affection that they have is an affection for providing themselves with nourishment and shelter, for reproducing, and for escaping or avoiding harm and injury, accompanied by all the requisite knowledge for these. Such being the state of their life, they cannot think, "I will this and do not will that," or "I know this and do not know that," still less, "I understand this" or "I love this." Rather they are borne along by their affection in accordance with their knowledge without rationality or freedom.

That they are so borne along is due not to the natural world but to the spiritual world. For there is nothing in the natural world disconnected from the spiritual world. Every cause producing an effect emanates from there.

Some observations on this subject may be seen also in no. 96 below.

Divine Providence (Dole translation 2003) 74

74. 2. Whatever we do from our freedom, whether we have thought it through rationally or not, seems to be ours as long as it is in accord with our reason. The clearest way to show what the rationality and freedom are that are proper to humans is to compare us with animals. They have no rationality or ability to comprehend and no freedom or ability to intend freely. Instead of discernment they have knowledge, and instead of intention they have desire, both on the physical level.

Since they lack these two abilities, they also lack thinking. Instead of thinking, they have an inner sight that is merged with their outer sight because it answers to it.

[2] Every impulse or desire has its own partner or spouse. A desire of physical love has knowledge, a desire of spiritual love has intelligence, and a desire of heavenly love has wisdom. This is because a desire without its partner--its spouse, so to speak--is nothing. It is like a reality with no manifestation or a substance with no form, neither of which can have any attributes. This is why there is something in everything that has been created that we can trace back to the marriage of what is good and what is true, as I have often explained before [5-9, 11].

In animals, there is a marriage of desire and knowledge. The desire involved comes from what is good on the physical level, and the knowledge comes from what is true on the physical level.

[3] Now, their desires and their knowledge act in absolute unison, and their desires cannot rise above the level of their knowledge or their knowledge above the level of their desires: if they do rise, they both rise together. Further, they have no spiritual mind into which--or into whose light and warmth--they can rise. Consequently, they do not have an ability to discern, or rationality, and do not have an ability to intend freely, or freedom. Instead they have simply physical desires and the knowledge that goes with them. Their physical desires are desires to find food and shelter, to procreate, and to avoid being hurt, with all the knowledge these impulses need.

Since this is the nature of their life, they cannot think, "I want this," or "I do not want this," or "I know this," or "I do not know this," let alone "I understand this" or "I love this." They are simply carried along by their desires according to their knowledge without reasoning or freedom.

This "carrying" comes not from the physical world but from the spiritual world, since there is nothing in the physical world that is not connected to the spiritual world. That is the source of every cause that makes something happen. There will be more on this below (see 96).

Divine Providence (Dick and Pulsford translation 1949) 74

74. II. WHATEVER A MAN DOES FROM FREEDOM, WHETHER IT BE OF REASON OR NOT, PROVIDED IT BE ACCORDING TO HIS REASON, APPEARS TO HIM TO BE HIS OWN. What rationality is and what liberty is, faculties which are proper to man, cannot be known more clearly than by a comparison of men with beasts. For beasts have no rationality or faculty of understanding, and no liberty or faculty of willing freely. Consequently they have no understanding and no will; but instead of understanding they have knowledge, and instead of will they have affection, and both of these are natural. As beasts do not possess these two faculties, they have no thought; but instead of thought they have an internal sight which makes one with their external sight by correspondence.

[2] Every affection has its own companion, a married partner as it were. An affection of natural love has knowledge, an affection of spiritual love, understanding, and an affection of celestial love, wisdom. For an affection without its companion as a married partner has no reality; it is as being (esse) without existing (existere), and as substance without form, of which nothing can be predicated. Hence it is, that in every created thing there is something that is referable to the marriage of good and truth, as has been shown above in many places. In beasts there is a marriage of affection and knowledge, the affection in them pertaining to natural good and the knowledge to natural truth.

[3] Now since affection and knowledge in beasts act completely as one, and their affection cannot be raised above their knowledge, and their knowledge not above their affection, but when raised they are both elevated together; and since they have no spiritual mind into which, or into the light and heat of which, they can be raised, therefore they have not the faculty of understanding or rationality, nor the faculty of willing freely or liberty; they have merely natural affection with its knowledge. The natural affection which they have is that of supplying themselves with food and shelter, of propagating their kind, of fleeing from and avoiding injury, together with all the knowledge which this affection requires. Such being the state of their life they cannot think, "I wish this or I do not; I know this or I do not"; and still less, "I understand this, and I love this"; but from their affection by means of their knowledge they are borne along without rationality and without liberty. That they are so borne along is not from the natural but from the spiritual world; because it is not possible for anything to exist in the natural world out of connection with the spiritual world, for every cause that produces an effect is from the spiritual world. Something on this subject may also be seen below (n. 96).

Divine Providence (Ager translation 1899) 74

74. (2) Whatever a man does from freedom, whether it be of reason or not, provided it is in accordance with his reason, appears to him to be his. What rationality and liberty, which are peculiar to man, are, can be most clearly understood by a comparison of man with beasts. For beasts have no rationality or ability to understand, and no liberty or ability to will freely; consequently they have no understanding or will, but in place of understanding they have knowledge, and in place of will they have affection, both of which are natural. And as they do not possess these two faculties, they have no thought, but in place of thought they have an internal sight which makes one by correspondence with their external sight.

[2] Every affection has its mate which is like a spouse; affection from natural love has knowledge, affection from spiritual love understanding, and affection from celestial love wisdom. For an affection without its mate as a spouse is not any thing; it is as being (esse) without coming forth (existere), or as substance without form, of which nothing can be predicated. Therefore, in every thing created there is something that is referable to the marriage of good and truth, as has been shown above in many places. In beasts there is a marriage of affection and knowledge, the affection in them pertaining to natural good, and knowledge to natural truth.

[3] Since, then, affection and knowledge in beasts act completely as one, and their affection cannot be raised above their knowledge nor their knowledge above their affection, but whenever raised are both raised together, and since they have no spiritual mind, into which, or into the light and heat of which, they can be raised, therefore they have no capacity to understand, that is, rationality, and no capacity to will freely, that is, liberty; they have merely natural affection with its knowledge. The natural affection that they possess is an affection for providing themselves food, shelter, and offspring, and for escaping or avoiding injury, with all requisite knowledge of these things. Such being the state of their life, they have no ability to think, This I wish or do not wish; this I know or do not know; or still less, this I understand, and this I love; but from their affection by means of their knowledge they are borne along without rationality or liberty. They are so borne along, not from the natural world, but from the spiritual. For there is nothing in the natural world unconnected with the spiritual world. From that world is every cause that produces an effect. Something on this subject may be seen below (96).

De Divina Providentia 74 (original Latin, 1764)

74. II. Quod quicquid homo ex libero facit, sive sit rationis sive non rationis, modo sit secundum ejus rationem, illi appareat ut ejus. Quid Rationalitas et quid Libertas, quae homini propriae sunt, non potest clarius sciri, quam per comparationem hominum cum bestiis, his enim non est aliqua rationalitas seu facultas intelligendi, nec aliqua libertas seu facultas libere volendi, et inde illis non est intellectus et voluntas, sed pro intellectu est scientia, et pro voluntate est affectio, utraque naturalis: et quia binae illae facultates non illis sunt, ideo illis nec est cogitatio, sed pro cogitatione est visus internus, qui unum facit cum visu illarum externo per correspondentiam.

[2] Unaquaevis affectio suam comparem sicut conjugem habet; affectio amoris naturalis habet scientiam, affectio amoris spiritualis intelligentiam, et affectio amoris coelestis sapientiam: nam affectio absque sua compare sicut conjuge non est aliquid, est enim sicut esse absque existere, ac sicut substantia absque forma, de quibus non aliquid praedicari potest; inde est, quod omni creato insit aliquid, quod ad conjugium boni et veri referri potest, ut supra multis ostensum est; in Bestiis est conjugium affectionis et scientiae; affectio ibi est boni naturalis, et scientia est veri naturalis.

[3] Nunc quia affectio et scientia apud illas prorsus unum agunt, et non potest affectio illarum elevari supra scientiam illarum, nec potest scientia supra affectionem, et si elevantur, elevatur utraque simul, et quia illis non est aliqua mens spiritualis, in quam seu in cujus lucem et calorem elevari possunt, ideo non illis est facultas intelligendi seu rationalitas, nec facultas libere volendi seu Libertas, sed est mera affectio naturalis cum sua scientia; affectio naturalis quae est illis, est affectio se nutriendi, habitandi, prolificandi, fugiendi et aversandi damna, cum omni scientia requisita illarum; quia talis status vitae illarum est, non possunt cogitare, hoc volo et non volo, nec hoc scio et non scio, minus hoc intelligo et hoc amo, sed feruntur ex affectione sua per scientiam absque rationalitate et libertate. Quod ita ferantur, non est ex naturali mundo, sed ex spirituali; nam non datur aliquid in mundo naturali inconnexum 1a mundo spirituali; omnis causa faciens effectum inde est: aliqua de hac re videantur etiam infra 96.

Footnotes:

1 Prima editio: inconuexum


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